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Abstract
Auerbach et al. (1995), document the dramatic postwar increase in the annuitization
of the resources of America’s elderly. Gokhale et al. (1996) suggest that greater
annuitization may explain the significant postwar rise in the consumption propensity
of the elderly out of remaining lifetime resources.  Gokhale et al. (2000) consider the
related point that increased annuitization will reduce bequests, especially for lower and
middle-income households, whose entire earnings are taxed under Social Security.
By differentially disenfranchising the children of the poor from receipt of inheritances,
Social Security may materially alter the distribution of wealth.  This paper uses data
from the PSID to further analyze how Social Security and other factors affect wealth
inequality. The Gini coefficient of the simulated equilibrium wealth distribution is 21
percent larger and the share of wealth held by the wealthiest 1 percent of households
is 79 percent higher in the presence of Social Security.
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As documented in Auerbach, et. al. (1995), the postwar period has witnessed a dramatic
increase in the annuitization of the resources of America’s elderly. Social security
appears to be the main force behind this process, but Medicare, Medicaid, and private
defined benefit pensions also play an important role in replacing household wealth
accumulation with survival-dependent old-age resource streams.  Gokhale, et. al. (1996)
suggest that the increased annuitization may explain the significant postwar rise in the
propensity of the elderly to consume their remaining lifetime resources.  Gokhale, et. al.
(2000) considers a related point, namely, that increased annuitization will reduce
bequests.  This is particularly the case for lower and middle-income households, who
face social security taxation on all of their earnings.  In differentially disenfranchising the
children of the poor from the receipt of inheritances, social security may be materially
altering the distribution of wealth. This paper builds on Gokhale, et. al. (2000) in trying
to understand how social security and other factors affect wealth inequality.
Gokhale, et. al. (2000) use synthetic data generated by CORSIM – a micro simulation
model – in conjunction with cross-section earnings data from the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) to calibrate the distribution of lifetime labor earnings.  Their simulated
distribution of wealth held by those reaching retirement closely matches that observed in
the SCF.  This is particularly true at the upper tail of the wealth distribution.  In addition
to matching the wealth distribution, Gokhale, et. al. decompose the influence of various
factors, including social security, on wealth inequality.  They point out that social
security, in differentially disenfranchising the children of the poor from receiving
substantial inheritances, plays a significant role in exacerbating wealth inequality.
 While intriguing, Gokhale, et. al.’s (2000) results should be viewed with caution given
the synthetic generation of lifetime earnings upon which they rely.  This paper attempts
to deal with that shortcoming by considering actual lifetime earnings as reported in the
long PSID panel.  The availability of actual lifetime earnings also permits a more
accurate calibration of the degree of assortative mating and inheritability of skills.  These
advantages must be set against a key disadvantage: the PSDI does not adequately capture
the skewness in the upper tail of the distribution of lifetime earnings.
Because we are using the PSID, which under-represents high earners, to generate the
distribution of lifetime earnings, and because the PSID data suggest a rather minor degree
of assortative mating, our simulated distribution of wealth holdings among households
reaching retirement is much less skewed than that reported in Gokhale, et. al. (2000).   It
is also less skewed than the 1995 SCF and and 1984 PSID wealth distributions of married
households ages 60-69.Although we are less successful than Gokhale, et. al. (2000) in
matching the upper tail of the wealth distribution, we continue to find that social security
plays an important role in making wealth holdings less equal.  The Gini coefficient for
our simulated distribution of wealth is 21 percent higher in the presence of social security
than in its absence.  And social security raises the share of wealth held by the wealthiest 1
percent of retiring households by 79 percent.I.  Introduction
As documented in Auerbach, et. al. (1995), the postwar period has witnessed a
dramatic increase in the annuitization of the resources of America’s elderly.  Indeed,
between 1960 and 1990, the annuitized share of resources of older men doubled and that
of older women quadrupled.  Social security is the main force behind this process, but
Medicare and Medicaid as well as private pensions play an important role in replacing
household wealth accumulation with survival-dependent old-age resource streams.
Gokhale, et. al. (1996) suggest that the increased annuitization may explain the
significant postwar rise in the propensity of the elderly to consume their remaining
lifetime resources.  Gokhale, et. al. (2000) considers a related point, namely, that
increased annuitization will reduce bequests.  This is particularly the case for lower and
middle-income households, who face social security taxation on all of their earnings.   In
differentially disenfranchising the children of the poor from the receipt of inheritances,
social security may be materially altering the distribution of wealth.
This paper builds on Gokhale, et. al. (2000) in trying to understand how social
security and other factors affect wealth inequality.  Specifically, this paper uses lifetime
earnings data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to calibrate Gokhale, et.
al.’s (2000) bequest simulation model.  The model features random death, random
fertility, assortative mating, heterogeneous human capital endowments, heterogeneous
rates of return, the inheritability of human capital, progressive income taxation, and the
partial annuitization through social security of households’ retirement savings.  Agents
have no bequest motive.  They live for at most 88 years, the first 22 as children, the
second 22 as young married adults who have children, the third 22 as middle-aged adults
raising children, and the last 22 as elderly individuals who die at random.  Survivingspouses inherit all their partner’s wealth, but bequeath their own wealth in equal portions
to their children.
Gokhale, et. al. (2000) use synthetic data generated by CORSIM – a micro
simulation model – in conjunction with cross-section earnings data from the Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) to calibrate the distribution of lifetime labor earnings.
Surprisingly, their simulated distribution of wealth held by those reaching retirement
closely matches that observed in the SCF.  This is particularly true at the upper tail of the
wealth distribution.  In addition to matching the wealth distribution, Gokhale, et. al.
decompose the influence of various factors, including social security, on wealth
inequality.  They show that absent social security, inheritances would reduce slightly the
degree of wealth inequality.  But in social security’s presence, they find that inheritances
significantly exacerbate wealth inequality.
 While intriguing, Gokhale, et. al.’s results should be viewed with caution given
the synthetic generation of lifetime earnings upon which they rely.  This paper attempts
to deal with that shortcoming by considering actual lifetime earnings as reported in the
long PSID panel.  The availability of actual lifetime earnings also permits a more
accurate calibration of the degree of assortative mating and inheritability of skills.  These
advantages must be set against a key disadvantage: the PSDI does not adequately capture
the skewness in the upper tail of the distribution of lifetime earnings.  Since the upper tail
of the distribution of lifetime earnings plays such a key role in determining the upper tail
of the distribution of wealth, this paper focuses on the shape of the distribution of wealth
in the bottom half of the wealth distribution.
Because we are using the PSID to generate the distribution of lifetime earnings,
and because the PSID data suggest a rather minor degree of assortative mating, our
simulated distribution of wealth holdings among households reaching retirement is muchless skewed than that reported in Gokhale, et. al. (2000).   It is also less skewed than the
1995 SCF and and 1984 PSID wealth distributions of married households ages 60-69.
Although we are less successful than Gokhale, et. al. (2000) in matching the upper
tail of the wealth distribution, we continue to find that social security plays an important
role in making wealth holdings less equal.  The Gini coefficient for our simulated
distribution of wealth is 16 percent higher in the presence of social security than in its
absence.  And social security raises the share of wealth held by the wealthiest 10 percent
of retiring households by almost one quarter.
The paper proceeds in Section II with a brief literature review.  Section III draws
heavily on Gokhale, et. al. (1990) in describing the model.  Section IV discusses the
model’s calibration.  Section V presents results, and Section VI draws conclusions.
II.  Related Literature
Wedgwood (1929), Harbury and Hitchens (1979), and Menchik (1979) are well-
sited studies that connect the wealth of sons to the estates of their fathers.  While
suggestive, their data don’t necessarily imply that inherited wealth is a source of
inequality.
1  Nevertheless, they reinforced Meade’s (1976) view that inheritances
exacerbate wealth inequality -- a conclusion supported by the theoretical model of
Wilhelm (1997).  Stiglitz (1969) and Stiglitz and Atkinson (1980) offered an alternative
perspective.  They showed that under certain assumptions, a stable, egalitarian
distribution of wealth would emerge if inheritances were distributed evenly among all of
one’s children.
                                                          
1 Their data record the total value of the father’s estate, rather than the amount actually inherited by the son.
And their findings may be explained, in large part, by the inheritances by sons of their fathers’ human
capital.The models Becker and Tomes (1979) and Tomes (1981) go beyond these studies
in examining the joint role that inheritances of financial wealth and earning power
(human capital) play in determining whether intergenerational transfers are equalizing.
Laitner (1979a and 1979b) constructs a utility-maximizing framework in which parents
care about both their own and their children’s consumption, bequests must be non-
negative, and there is no inheritability of human capital.  He shows that an equilibrium
wealth distribution exists and that inheritances are equalizing if there is no assortative
mating – an issue first examined by Blinder (1973).  The studies of Meade (1964),
Stiglitz (1969), Pryor (1973), Atkinson and Harrison (1978), and Atkinson (1980) also
stress the role of imperfect correlation of spouses’ inheritances in equalizing the
distribution of inheritances.
2
Early simulation studies of wealth inequality include Atkinson (1971), Flemming
(1976), Oulton (1976), and Wolfson (1977).   Their central finding is that, absent
bequests, the life-cycle model is unable to explain the upper tail of the wealth
distribution.  Wolfson (1979) and Davies (1982) add bequests, specifically desired
bequests, and generate much more realistic skewness in the distribution of wealth.
Flemming (1979) is the closest antecedent to our work.  He too considers earnings
heterogeneity and the inheritability of skills, but not marriage, assortative mating, or
heterogeneity in the number and spacing of children.  Flemming finds that wealth is
much more unequally divided than earnings and that both unintended and intended
bequests can markedly increase wealth inequality.  Although many of our findings agree
with Flemming’s, we find that, in the absence of social security, unintended bequests
serve to reduce slightly intragenerational wealth inequality.
                                                          
2 Theoretical work on taxation provides additional grounds for believing that inheritances are equalizing.
Becker and Tomes (1979) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) show that inheritance taxation can increase
income inequality.  However if there are incomplete markets, such as the market for educational loansEmpirical Support for Excluding Altruism
Although Laitner and Juster (1996) provide some limited support for altruism,
most recent studies do not.  To be precise, Boskin and Kotlikoff (1985), Altonji, Hayashi
and Kotlikoff (1992, 1997), Abel and Kotlikoff (1994), Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff
(1996), Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1996), Wilhelm (1996), and Hurd (1992)
show that a) the distribution of consumption across cohorts is very strongly dependent on
the cross-cohort distribution of resources, b) the distribution of consumption within
extended families is very strongly dependent on the distribution of resources within
extended families, c) that taking a dollar from a child and handing it to parents who are
actively transferring income to that child leads the parent to hand back only 13 cents to
the child, d) that the very major postwar increase in the annuitization of the resources of
the elderly has not been even partially offset by an increase in their holdings of life
insurance, e) that the vast majority of bequests are distributed equally among children
independent of their economic needs, and f) the presence of children doesn’t influence
post-retirement dissaving.   Individually and as a group, these studies constitute very
strong evidence against intergenerational altruism, suggesting that most bequests may be
unintended or motivated by non-altruistic considerations – the modeling assumption
made here.
It is frequently observed that retired consumers save rather than dissave. Prima
facie this might indicate a bequest motive in some form (Hurd, 1990).  However
Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1996) and Miles (1997) point out that when wealth is
calculated to include the capitalized value of social security receipts, it falls throughout
retirement.  Hurd also concludes from a careful analysis of panel and cross-section data
                                                                                                                                                                            
considered by Loury (1981), redistributive taxation of bequests can reduce intragenerational inequality.that the evidence on wealth changes is consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis and the
view that bequests are accidental.
Meade (1966) and Flemming (1976) provide a final reason to doubt the
prevalence of altruistically motivated bequests. They pointed out that anything less than
very strong altruism would not suffice to generate ubiquitous and significant bequests
since the lifetime incomes of children significantly exceed those of their parents.
III.  The Model and Its Calibration
This section describes the model’s demographic structure, skill allocation,
determination of inheritance, and consumption and saving behavior.
Demographics
Agents can live for 88 periods, the first 22 of which they spend as children whose
consumption is financed by their parents. All events, including earnings, consumption,
marriages, births, deaths, wealth transfers, occur at the end of each period.  Agents marry
on their 22
nd birthday.  They give birth to children at ages 22 through 43, depending on
their draw from a "birth matrix" described below.  They also enter the work force on their
22
nd birthday and work through age 66.  They face positive probabilities of dying
between ages 67 and 88.  The probability of an agent’s dying on her 88
th birthday, given
that she has lived to that date, is 100 percent.  The probabilities of dying at ages 67
through 87 are taken from U.S. mortality statistics.
The number, sexes, and timing of children born to each couple are determined
randomly.  This distribution is aligned to ensure that 2000 males and 2000 females are
born each year.  There is no population growth, so total annual births remain fixed
through time.Consumption and Saving Behavior
Agents’ expected utility are time-separable isoelastic functions of their own
current and future consumption as well as that of their children through age 22.
Consider, as an example, the expected utility of a couple that is age 23 and will have two
children, one when the couple is age 25 and the other when it is 28:
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In (1), the first summation considers the utility of each spouse from his or her own
consumption at each possible age to which they could live.  The second two summations
consider the utility that the couple derives from the consumption of their two children.
The terms cha , cwa , ck1a , and ck2a refer, respectively, to the consumption of the husband,
wife, first child, and second child when the couple is age a.  The term β  is the time-
preference factor, σ  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and δ  is a child-
consumption weighting factor.
As σ  approaches zero, households become more and more reluctant (they become
more and more concerned about) consuming smaller amounts in the future than they
consume in the present.  Since the inverse of σ  is the household’s coefficient of relative
risk aversion, a value of σ  close to zero translates into a coefficient of risk aversion close
to infinity.  In our simulations, we assume that σ  is very close to zero.  Hall (1988)
reports that there is “... no strong evidence that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is positive.  Earlier findings of substantial positive elasticities are reversed when
appropriate estimation methods are used.”Assuming that σ  is very close to zero simplifies enormously household
consumption decisions.  First this assumption in conjunction with the assumption of a
time preference rate equal to the interest rate means that households seek to maintain the
same level of consumption over time for each spouse.  Households also seek to maintain
a constant level of consumption for their children, when they are children.  Given the
value of δ , this child-consumption level equals 40 percent of the parental consumption
level.
But most important, our assumption that  σ  is very close to zero means that
households only consider their safe resources in deciding how much to consume at each
point in time.  Thus households who expect to receive an inheritance, but don’t know for
sure that they’ll get one (because all of their parents may to age 88), will ignore this
potential source of future income in making their current consumption and saving
decisions.
At each point in time, married households will calculate the number of years of
remaining life, multiply this amount by 2 (to take into account the presence of both
spouses) and then add to the resulting value .4 times the number of years of consumption
of their children.  This total number of effective adult consumption-years is then divided
into the household’s safe resources to determine consumption per effective adult.  The
household’s safe resources consist of its wealth (which may reflect the receipt of past
inheritances) plus the present value of its remaining lifetime labor earnings.  Given the
level of consumption per effective adult, it’s straightforward to calculate total household
consumption and subtract it from total household income to determine household saving.
We want to emphasize that inheritances affect consumption behavior, but only
once they are received.  There is no consumption out of potential future inheritances.
Instead households, at each point in time, consider the worst-case scenario and formulatetheir consumption and saving plans accordingly. Were we to assume a positive value of σ
, households would take a gamble and consume more in the presence in anticipation of
possibly inheriting in the future.  But their decision as to how much to consume would be
extraordinarily complex.  The reason is that they would, at certain ages, have to take into
account not simply their own resources, including their own wealth, but also that of their
parents and their grandparents, assuming their grandparents are still alive.  Take, for
example, a 25 year-old couple with two sets of living parents and four sets of living
grandparents.  In deciding how much to consume the household has to consider its own
current wealth level as well as the wealth levels of all six parental and grandparental
households.  Formally, the dynamic program that the household must solve to determine
how much to consume involves up to seven state variables, namely all seven of these
wealth levels.
3  Unfortunately, solving dynamic programs with seven state variables
appears to be beyond the capacity of current computers.
4
Assortative Mating
Agents are assigned their marriage partners at age 22 on a partly systematic basis
in which the probability of a match is higher the closer are the respective skill ranks of
the two partners.  Our assortative mating works as follows.  We first construct for each
year of the simulation a vector A containing 2000 random numbers drawn from a uniform
distribution with support (0,1).  Vector A is sorted in ascending order.  Second, a vector
B is constructed containing 2000 random numbers from the same distribution but is left
unsorted.  Third, vector C = α A + (1−α )B is constructed to yield a new vector of
                                                          
3 We say “up to” because during years in which the household is age 66 and over, it has neither living
parents nor living grandparents, and during years in which the household is age 44 through 65, it has no
living grandparents.
4 The fact that even supercomputers would have difficulty solving this problem in a reasonable amount of
time raises the question of how mere mortals can actually deal with this complexity.numbers between 0 and 1.  Fourth, we associate with the first element of the C vector the
integer 1, with the second element the integer 2, and so on up to the last element of C to
which we associate the integer 2000.  Fifth, we sort C such that C ends up in ascending
order and denote the associated integers as vector R.  This vector is used to assign the
husband’s skill rank, j, for each female skill rank, where the female skills are aligned in
ascending order), i=1…2000.
For example, suppose that, for a given year, after the C vector has been generated
and sorted in ascending order, the first three integers associated with the first three
elements of the C vector are 3, 51, and 1290.  Then the most skilled 22 year-old female in
that year will be married to the 3
rd most skilled 22 year-old male, the 2
nd most skilled 22
year-old female will be married to the 51
st most skilled 22 year-old male, and the 3
rd most
skilled 22 year-old female will be married to the 1290
th most skilled 22 year-old male.
The parameter α  is chosen to reproduce the rank correlation coefficient between
husband’s and wives’ lifetime earnings, which we estimate in the PSID.
Inheritance of Skills
The procedure just described for correlating husbands’ and wives’ lifetime
earnings is also used to determine the correlation between fathers’ and sons’ lifetime
earnings as well as the correlation between mothers’ and daughters’ lifetime earnings.  In
each case, the relevant parameter α  is calibrated to reproduce the rank correlation
coefficient observed between sons’ (daughters’) and fathers’ (mothers’) lifetime earnings.
Fertility
An initial population (at time t=0) of 4000 thousand individuals (2000 males and
2000 females) was created for each age between 0 and 87.  This was done as follows:First, a matrix of "birth ages" was derived from a fertility simulation of CORSIM – a
dynamic microsimulation model of the U.S. economy described in Caldwell et al. (1998).
The simulation considered 40,434 females born between 1945 and 2000 and recorded
their ages of giving birth if those ages fell between ages 22 and 43.  For each female in
our CORSIM sample, we stored this information in our CORSIM birth matrix that
accommodates a maximum of 10 birth ages, 5 for male and 5 for female births.  Thus, the
matrix has 40,434 rows and 10 columns.  Table 1.1 shows the distribution of females in
the CORSIM matrix by number and sex of births.
Since, computer memory limitations allowed us to process only 4000 individuals
in each year of birth, we needed to pare down our birth matrix in such a way as to end up
with a modified birth matrix that contains exactly 2000 male births and 2000 female
births.  We started by selecting 2000 rows from the birth matrix.  The selection was done
at random without replacement except that rows containing more than 5 births were
excluded.  The total number of births in the selected 2000-row matrix exceeded 4000.
Hence, we randomly eliminated male and female births in the rows of this matrix for
rows containing more than one birth until we were left with precisely 2000 male and
2000 female births.  This guaranteed that the 2000 rows of the final birth matrix would
generate exactly 2000 female and 2000 male births.  Table 1.2 shows the distribution of
females by the number and sex of their births in the birth matrix used in the simulation.
Populating the Model at Time Zero
We populated our model by first creating 2000 male and 2000 female old-adults
for each age between 67 and 88.  These males and females were then married to each
other sequentially.  Some of these oldsters were treated as dead when we initiate the
simulation.  But we needed to include their ghosts at this stage of our process ofpopulating the model in order to establish complete family trees.  Marriage was allowed
only between people of the same age to be consistent with our assumption that marriage
occurs at age 22 (i.e., that initial oldster males married initial oldster females when they
were 22 and their wives were 22).  Family relationships were established by exchanging
id numbers.
In our next step, we drew from the 2000 thousand rows of the birth matrix at
random (but without replacement) the middle-aged and young-adult children of the initial
oldsters, ranging in age from 24 through 66.  In this process, we do not permit oldsters to
bear children in their twilight years, rather we are retrospectively considering the births of
the initial oldsters when they were in their child-bearing years.
Given that females give birth between the ages of 22 and 43, oldsters aged 88 at
the initiation of our simulation (t=0) have children who are aged 45 through 66; oldsters
aged 87 at t=0 have children aged 44 through age 65; and so on, until we reach oldsters
aged 67 at t=0 who would have children aged between 24 and 45.  Thus, at this stage of
our populating procedure, exactly 4000 (the full compliment of) 45 year-olds and less
than 4000 thousand individuals at other ages between 24 and 66 have been created.  The
reason is that everyone (including oldster ghosts) who could have given birth to 45 year-
olds has been considered, but not everyone who gave birth to those between ages 24 and
44 and those between ages 46 and 66 has been considered.
Since at this stage there are fewer than 4000 middle-aged males and females at
ages 46-66, additional middle-aged males and females are created such that they total
4000 for each of these age groups.  Next, all middle-aged males and females (those aged
45 through 66) were married at random, making sure that siblings were not married to
each other.  Next, the children of middle-aged adults were created, again taking draws
without replacement from the birth matrix for females of a given age and then doing thesame for females of another age until all females age 45 through 66 had been considered.
The children produced by this process range in age from 2 through 44.
5  Given that we’ve
already created the children of the t=0 oldsters, the addition of these children leave us
with exactly 2000 males and 2000 females aged 23 through 44—the young adults.  The
procedure just described was also used to marry the young adults.
The next step in the creation of the initial population was creating the children of
the t=0 young adults that were born at t=–1 or earlier.  Each young-adult female was
assigned a row of the birth matrix at random without replacement, and children were
created for all birth ages less than the age at t=0 of the female in question.  For example,
a 44 year-old female’s children were created for birth ages between 22 and 43, but a 23
year-old’s children are created only if her birth-row assignment contains a birth-age of
22.  That is, children that will be born at t=0 or later were not created as yet.  At the end
of this process, exactly 2000 males and 2000 females had been created for each age
between 1 and 88.  The final step in creating the initial population was to kill off oldsters
(make the ghosts disappear) according to their cumulative mortality probabilities.
6
Populating the Model through Time
In populating the model through time we do the following.  First, for t=0, we
allocate at random and without replacement a row from the birth matrix to all 22 year-old
females.  Second, we marry 22-year-olds males and females at random, or according to
the assortative mating procedure described above.  Third, we have females age 22-43
                                                          
5 Sixty-six-year-olds have children aged between 23 and 44; 65 year-olds have children aged between 22
and 43; and so on through 45 year-olds who have children aged between 2 and 23.
6 The mortality probabilities are based on U.S. mortality tables.  Conditional mortality probabilities below
age 67 are set to zero and the conditional mortality probability at age 88 is set to unity. The probability of
dying at age=a, da, is calculated as
                        a-1
da=(1-σ a) Π  σ s,
               s=67give birth as determined by their assigned birth matrix row creating 2000 newborn (0-
year-old) males and 2000 newborn (0 year-old) females.  Fourth, we kill off oldsters at
random according to the conditional probability of dying at their respective ages.  The
wealth of these oldsters is transferred to the surviving spouse or children.  Fourth, we age
everyone by one year.
Using the PSID to Calculate Lifetime Earnings
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) began in 1968 with a representative
sample of 5,000 U.S. households.  The PSID has re-interviewed (or attempted to re-
interview) the individuals from those households every year since that time, regardless of
their demographic status, living arrangements, etc.  Children of original PSID
respondents have been followed after they have left their parents’ households.
Forming longitudinal labor income profiles involves the following steps: First,
labor income, family number, and sex variables for “head” and “wife” are extracted from
the family file for year x and merged with the individual file by year-x family number,
retaining only those observations that appeared in year x.
7  Step 1 is repeated separately
for each year from 1968 to 1993 to create 26 separate data files.  Each data file is sorted
by “family interview number” and “person number” (in that order), and all are merged
together to form a single “cross-year individual” file containing individual longitudinal
labor income profiles.
                                                                                                                                                                            
where σ s is the conditional probability of surviving at age s.
7 The PSID’s file structure comprises one cross-year individual file and several single-year family
files.  The cross-year individual file contains records for all individuals that ever appeared in the survey—
whether these individuals were members of the original sample of households or households that formed
after 1968.  This individual file contains a “person number” variable indicating the response status for each
individual which can be associated with the family number to create a unique person identifier.
Unfortunately, the cross-year individual file does not contain labor income for “head” and “wife” for all of
the years.  Hence it was necessary to select these variables from the single-year family files and merge
them together to form individual longitudinal labor income profiles.The PSID reports annual labor income in nominal dollars.  To place the income
earned in different years on a comparable basis, we divide each year’s values by the ratio
of that year’s Social Security Administration’s average wage index to the average wage
index in 1997.  Using this wage index to re-scale nominal labor income adjusts not only
for inflation, but also for labor productivity growth.  The base year is selected to be 1997
because that year’s federal income tax rates and brackets are used to implement
progressive income taxation in our simulation.  Our motivation for controlling for
productivity growth in forming lifetime earnings is simple: our model does not account
for productivity growth. Our next step is to sort the cross-year individual file by sex.
8
Not all individuals appear in the PSID in each year between 1968 and 1993.
Moreover, some individuals appear as “head” or “wife” for just a few years.  To ensure a
minimum number of data points from which to form lifetime earnings, we retained in our
sample only those individuals who appear for at least 10 years as “head” or “wife”
between the ages of 23 and 66.
Since the PSID spans only 26 years it cannot provide us with earnings profiles for
the full complement of 44 years (from age 23 to age 66) of earnings – the lifetime
earnings profile as required by our simulation.  Hence, we adopt a procedure for
extrapolating each individual’s labor income both backward and forward as required.
First, we calculate average labor incomes for all males who appeared in the sample (as
“head” or “wife”) at each age between 23 and 66.
9  This provides us with a benchmark
age-earnings profile for males—M23-M66.  This procedure is repeated for females to
generate a corresponding benchmark profile for females—F23-F66.
                                                          
8 We classify appropriately female “heads” and male “wifes.”
9 Thus, those who appeared in the sample at their age 23 are included in calculating the average labor
income for age 23; those who appeared in the sample at age 24 are included in calculating the average labor
income at age 24…and so on through age 66.Next, for each individual, we calculate two average labor incomes.  A1 is the
average labor income over the first five years of the person’s presence in the sample, and
A2 is the average labor income over the last five years that the person is present in the
sample (as “head” or “wife”).  For example, if a female appeared in the sample at each
age between 35 and 54, A1 would be her average labor income at ages 35 through 39,
and A2 would be average labor income at ages 50 through 54.  A1 is used to extrapolate
her labor income backward—from age 34 through age 23.  Her imputed income at age 34
equals A1 times the ratio of M34 to the average of M35-M39; her imputed income at age
33 equals A1 times the ratio of M33 to the average of M35-M39, and so on.  A similar
procedure is adopted when extrapolating individuals’ labor incomes forward—beyond
their oldest age as a PSID “head” or “wife” (54 for the male in the current example)
through age 66.
The sample of individuals for whom we could compute/impute lifetime earnings
profiles in this manner included 4206 males and 4419 females.  However, our simulation
includes only 2000 individuals of each sex.  To arrive at 2000 male and female lifetime
earnings profiles, we proceed in the following manner.  First we replicate each of the
4206 male and 4419 female observations in proportion to their sample population
weights.  Second, we group to the nearest integer the “blown-up” males and females into
.05 percentiles of the present value of lifetime earnings.  Third, we pick the observation
with the highest value of lifetime earnings in each of the .05 percentiles.  This gives us
2000 males and 2000 females whose level and pattern of lifetime earnings are used in the
simulation.Calibrating the Degree of Assortative Mating and the Inheritability of Skills
Armed with the original (not blown up by population weights) lifetime earnings
of the sample of 4206 males and 4419 females, we formed for each year of the PSID
sample the rank correlation coefficients between a) the lifetime earnings of husbands and
their wives observed in that year and b) the lifetime earnings of fathers (mothers) and
sons (daughters) observed in that year.  The average (across all the years) values of the
husband-wife and same-sex parent-same-sex child rank correlation coefficients are .10
and .44, respectively.  These coefficients are used to calibrate the α  parameters mentioned
above.
Before proceeding, we should point out that the .10 husband-wife rank correlation
coefficient is quite small relative to our priors.  It’s also much smaller than the .70
guesstimate used by Gokhale, et. al. (2000).  If the value is correct, and we have no
reason to doubt it, it suggests that assortative mating on the basis of lifetime earnings may
not be an important factor.
Bequests and Inheritances
When a spouse dies, his or her surviving spouse retains all the couple’s marital
wealth; i.e., all bequests of married agents go to their spouses.  When a widow or
widower or if both spouses die at the same time, the decedent(s’) wealth is evenly divided
among the children.
Initial Wealth Endowments and Length of the Simulations
We start each of our simulations by giving all adults at t=0 an endowment of
wealth of 1 unit.  We then run the model for enough years into the future until the
distribution of wealth of 67 year-olds as well as the total amount of wealth in theeconomy stabilizes.  Since the asymptotic wealth distribution as well as the total level of
wealth are independent of the initial level and distribution of wealth, the fact that we start
with this particular initial endowment of wealth doesn’t alter our results.  In practice, both
the wealth distribution of 67 year-olds and the total level of wealth converge well before
150 years in each of our simulations.  But to guarantee consistency across simulations,
we run each simulation for 150 years.
Including Interest Rate Heterogeneity
Different households face different rates of return on their portfolios because they
systematically choose to hold different portfolios.  To incorporate rate-of-return
heterogeneity, we use data on the portfolio holdings of households from the 1995 SCF.
Our first step entails classifying those household assets reported in the survey into several
categories.  Next, we assign a rate of return to each asset category, and compute the
portfolio-weighted rate of return that each household faces, given its portfolio of assets.
10
Finally, we compute the weighted frequency of households for rates of return ranging
                                                          
10 The asset categories are liquid assets, government bonds, private bonds and bond mutual fund shares,
stocks and stock mutual funds, real estate, and other non-financial assets.  Liability categories include
mortgages and real estate debt and other debt.  In forming a weighted average rate of return on each
household’s portfolio, we used the absolute value of liabilities.  For liquid assets we assumed the geometric
average annual real rate of return (0.68 percent) on U.S. Treasury bills during the period 1926-97.  For
government bonds we use the geometric average annual real rate of return on long and intermediate term
government bonds between 1926 and 1997 (2.09 percent).  For private bonds and bond mutual funds we
use the geometric average rate of return on long-term corporate bonds between 1926 and 1997 (2.52
percent).  For stocks and stock mutual funds, we use the weighted average of real rates of return on large
and small company stocks (8.00 percent).  The weights for the two stock market returns were obtained from
analysts at the Wilshire 5000 company.  The source for the aforementioned average rates of return is the
1998 Yearbook published by Ibbotson Associates. The average rates of interest on mortgages and other real
estate debt was constructed using date from Case and Shiller (1990) who report annualized excess returns
(excess over the 3-month T-bill return) on home-purchases for each quarter between 1971 and 1986 in four
large U.S. metropolitan areas.  We computed the total returns by adding the annualized real T-bill return for
each quarter, calculated the geometric mean over the period of the study, and averaged the rates of return
over the four metropolitan areas.  This procedure yields a real rate of return of 0.45 percent.  Finally the
rate of return for mortgage and real estate debt was calculated as the geometric average nominal mortgage
rate between 1973 and 1997 divided by the geometric average rate of inflation over the same period.  This
yielded 3.91 percent.  The average real rate on other debt was assumed to be 13.54 percent the rate
applicable for 1995—obtained from the Statistical Abstract for the United States, 1998, Table 820.from zero to 10+ percent in steps of 0.5 percent.  This frequency distribution is used to
randomly allocate the average rate of return within each step to households in the
simulation.  Households are assumed to earn their assigned rate of return in each year of
their lives.
Additional Issues of Calibration
The mortality probabilities used in the analysis are those released by the U.S.
Social Security Administration for 1995.  The interest rate used in the simulations is 4
percent. To obtain a realistic shape of the age-consumption profile, we assume that the
time preference factors generate a 1.5 percent growth in the planned path of consumption
per equivalent adult through age 65.
11  From age 66 through age 88, planned consumption
per equivalent adult remains constant.  As mentioned, our fertility matrix is derived from
simulating CORSIM.  Its fertility module includes separate logistic functions for 30
different subgroups of women estimated using data from the National Longitudinal
Survey.
The subgroups are distinguished by age, the presence of children, marital status,
race, and work status.  The regressors in the logits are age, duration of current marriage,
earnings, family income, homeowner status, marital status, schooling status, work status,
and duration since the birth of women’s two youngest children.   In producing the larger
birth matrix from which we selected 2000 rows, we ran the CORSIM model from its start
year of 1960 through 2000.  In so doing, we used the entire panoply of CORSIM modules
to assign CORSIM agents the various socio-economic characteristics, such as work
status, entering as regressors in the fertility logits.
                                                          
11 Actual consumption per equivalent adult prior to age 66 will differ from planned consumption if the
household receives one or more inheritances.IV.  Findings
Tables 1 and 2 describe the distributions of wealth resulting from 11 different
simulations.  Our base-case simulation incorporates mortality prior to age 88, assortative
mating, heterogeneity in skills, inheritance of skills, life-cycle consumption growth,
heterogeneity in rates of return, progressive income taxation, and a social security system
with a ceiling on taxable income.  The other 10 simulations are variants on the base case
that leave out one, or, in the case of simulation 11, two of these elements.
Row 1 in Table 1 shows results for our base-case simulation, including a wealth
Gini of .336 and a consumption Gini of .283 among age-66 households.  The
consumption Gini is smaller because consumption is financed in part by social security
benefits, and these benefits are more evenly distributed than is net wealth.  Row 1 also
indicates that the steady-state flow of total bequests in our model is 4.5 percent of
aggregate labor earnings, and the cross-generational flow is 1.5 percent of aggregate
labor earnings.  This cross-generational flow of bequests appears to be about half as large
as in the actual U.S. economy.  We say this because our own unpublished calculations
using the 1962 and 1995 SCFs suggest that cross-generational bequests in the actual
economy are roughly 3 percent of total labor compensation.
12
Figure 1 graphs the first row of Table 2 -- the wealth distribution of age-66
couples generated by our base-case simulation.  It also compares this distribution with
wealth distributions of married couples whose heads are age 60-69 in a) the 1995 SCF
and b) the 1984 PSID.  As the figure makes clear, the concentration of wealth at the very
                                                          
12 In forming these calculations we first benchmarked 1962 and 1995 SCF net worth and life insurance
holdings to Federal Reserve Flow of Funds and American Council of Life Insurance respective reported
aggregates.  Next we calculated the flow of bequests by age and sex by a) assuming that single people with
children leave their entire estates to their children, b) assuming that married decedents leave 15 percent of
their estates to their children, and c) assuming that all decedents have the same age- and sex-specific
mortality rates as those that prevailed in 1962 and 1994. Our estimated ratios of cross-generational bequests
to total labor compensation are .030 for 1962 and .033 for 1994.top of the wealth distribution is much more substantial in the SCF.  The SCF wealth Gini
is .73 – more than twice as large as our simulated Gini.
Why is our model generating too little skewness in the distribution of wealth
compared to the SCF? The answer, we believe, is that a) the PSID distribution of lifetime
earnings is much less skewed than that of the actual economy and b) the skewness of
lifetime earnings makes a big difference for the skewness in our simulated distribution of
wealth.  To see the importance of our assumed degree of earnings inequality to our
simulated wealth inequality, consider the row-2 results in Tables 1 and 2, which omit
labor earnings heterogeneity.  Without skill differences, the wealth Gini falls from .336 to
.097.  The fact that there is any wealth inequality in the absence of skill inequality is due
to differences across households in the number and timing of their children as well as
differences in the rates of return earned on their saving.
The PSID earnings data from which we construct our male and female
distributions of lifetime earnings is certainly much less skewed than the corresponding
male and female cross-section distributions of earnings in the SCF.   This would explain
why the simulated wealth distribution in our base case is less concentrated than in the
SCF.
What’s harder to explain is why the PSID’s wealth concentration in the top tail is
much greater than that simulated by the model.  This may reflect a higher degree of
underreporting of earnings among the rich than of their assets.  One way to get at this
possibility is to compare the distribution of wealth among the poorest (measured in terms
of wealth) of our age-66 simulated couples with the corresponding distribution of wealth
among the poorest half of the SCF age 60-69 year-old couples.  Figure 2 makes this
comparison.  While our model fits the distribution of the truncated data quite well at the
very top of the tail, the fit in the rest of the top tail is not very good.Determinants of Wealth Inequality
The remaining simulations in Tables 1 and 2 examine other determinants of
wealth inequality.  Consider first simulation 3, which eliminates assortative mating.
Given the limited assortative mating we find in the data and incorporate in the base case,
it’s not surprising that eliminating asortative mating altogether makes very little
difference to simulated wealth inequality.  A second “non-factor” with respect to the
distribution of wealth is the inheritance of skills from parents.  How agents come to have
their skills doesn’t appear to matter much for the cross-section distribution of wealth.
This is clear from Simulation 4 that eliminates the inheritablity of skills, leaving the Gini
at essentially its base-case value.
Simulation 5 eliminates consumption growth by which we mean we alter the
model’s time-preference factors so that agents wish to have the same living standard per
equivalent adult as they age.  This smoothing of consumption generates more liquidity
constrained households showing up at age 66 with zero wealth, which, in turn, implies
more wealth inequality.  The wealth Gini in this case is .427 – 27 percent higher than in
the base case.
Simulation 6 turns off interest rate heterogeneity.  This makes little difference to
the distribution of wealth.  The explanation here is that, other things equal, households
earning higher rates of return can afford to and do consume more at each point in time.
Since accumulated assets reflect accumulated differences between past levels of earnings
and consumption, this factor lowers the age-66 wealth holdings of couples earning high
rates of return.  On the other hand, the smaller differences between past earnings and
consumption are accumulated at a higher rate of return.  This factor raises the age-66
wealth holdings of high rate or return couples.  According to the results, these two factors
roughly cancel leaving wealth inequality essentially the same as in the case of no interestrate heterogeneity.  In contrast to interest rate heterogeneity, progressive income taxation
does play an important role in influencing wealth.  In Simulation 7, this form of taxation
is eliminated raising the Gini coefficient from .336 to .436.  And the share of wealth held
by the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution rises from 7 percent to 9.4 percent.
The Role of Inheritances and Social Security in Wealth Inequality
How important are bequests and their associated inheritances to wealth
inequality? Simulation 8 addresses this question.  It sets the probability of dying prior to
age 88 at zero.  Compared to the base case, this experiment reduces only slightly wealth
inequality.  So, in the presence of social security, inheritances make the distribution of
wealth more unequal.  Is the same true if social security is absent? The answer, found by
comparing Simulations 9 and 11, is no.  With inheritances, but without social security,
wealth inequality is somewhat smaller – the same finding reported in Gokhale, et. al.
(2000).
How much does social security itself raise wealth inequality? The answer found
by comparing Simulations 9 and 1 is a fair amount.  Adding social security to the model’s
other features raises the wealth Gini by over 20 percent.  It also almost doubles the share
of wealth held by the top 1 percent of wealth holders.  Figure 3 shows the impact of
removing social security on the wealth levels of age-66 couples at different percentiles of
the wealth distributions. For those in the 75
th percentile, eliminating social security would
raise their age-66 wealth by a factor of 2.55.   In contrast, for those in the top 1 percentile,
eliminating social security would raise their wealth by a factor of only 1.55.
Why does social security increase wealth inequality? A small part of the reason,
as previously mentioned, is that social security transforms inheritances into a
disequalizing force.  According to Table 1, it also reduces the intergenerational flow ofinheritances by over 50 percent.  But the main reason, as confirmed by Simulation 10,
that social security is disequalizing is simply the ceiling that social security applies to its
tax collection.  This ceiling makes social security treat the lifetime rich more favorably
than the lifetime poor.  It also differentially annuitizes the lower classes.  Absent the
ceiling, the wealth Gini would be .242, compared to .336 in the base case, and the share
of wealth held by the top 1 percent would be 2.9 percent, compared with 7 percent in the
base case.
V.  Conclusion
Given our use of the PSID, which under-samples very high earning Americans, to
calibrate the distribution of lifetime earnings, it’s not surprising that our model fails to
reproduce the extreme skewness of the top tail of the U.S. wealth distribution.  On the
other hand, our analysis confirms the proposition advanced by Gokhale, et. al. (2000) that
social security exacerbates wealth inequality by annuitizing a larger proportion of the old
age resources of the lifetime poor than of the lifetime rich.  In so doing, social security
not only changes the form in which the poor elderly hold most of their resources, it also
denies their children the opportunity to receive inheritances.  Consequently, inheritances
become a cause of wealth inequality rather than wealth equality.  All told, social security
appears to be raising wealth inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, by roughly
one fifth, substantially increasing the share of total wealth held by the richest members of
society, and greatly reducing the flow of bequests to the next generation.References
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1 Base Case 0.336 0.283 4.5 1.5
2 No Skill Differences 0.097 0.045 4.3 1.4
3 No Marital Sorting 0.324 0.270 4.6 1.5
4 No Inheritance of Skills 0.327 0.277 4.6 1.5
5 No Consumption Growth 0.427 0.286 1.8 0.6
6 No Interest Rate Heterogeniety 0.332 0.279 4.5 1.4
7 No Progressive Income Taxes 0.436 0.317 3.2 1.0
8 No Inheritances 0.325 0.287 0.0 0.0
9 No Social Security 0.278 0.271 10.6 3.4
10 No Ceiling on SS Taxable Income 0.242 0.272 3.9 1.2
11 No Inheritances and No Social Security 0.285 0.278 0.0 0.0
Source: Authors’ calculations.Table 2:  Simulated Wealth Distributions
Case Simulation Percent of Wealth Held by Top
99% 95% 90% 75% 50% 25% 10% 5% 1%
1 Base Case 100.0 99.2 97.4 89.8 71.8 47.6 27.6 18.4 7.0
2 No Skill Differences 99.4 96.7 92.9 80.3 56.9 30.5 13.5 7.2 1.6
3 No Marital Sorting 100.0 99.1 97.2 89.3 71.0 46.7 26.8 17.8 6.6
4 No Inheritance of Skills 100.0 99.2 97.4 89.5 71.2 46.8 26.9 17.8 6.6
5 No Consumption Growth 100.0 99.5 98.2 92.2 76.9 54.9 35.4 25.1 10.3
6 No Interest Rate Heterogeniety 100.0 99.3 97.5 89.7 71.6 47.1 27.1 17.9 6.5
7 No Progressive Income Taxes 100.0 99.5 98.4 92.8 78.1 55.5 34.4 23.8 9.4
8 No Inheritances 100.0 99.4 97.7 89.8 71.2 46.3 26.2 17.2 6.3
9 No Social Security 100.0 99.2 97.4 89.1 69.0 42.1 21.2 12.6 3.8
10 No Ceiling on SS Taxable Income 100.0 99.1 97.0 87.8 66.8 39.4 18.9 10.7 2.9
11 No Inheritances and No Social Security 100.0 99.4 97.7 89.6 69.5 42.4 21.3 12.7 3.9
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